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LUNAR NAVIGATION ARCHITECTURE DESIGN 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Dr. Christopher D’Souza,* Joel Getchius,† Dr. Greg Holt‡, and Dr. Michael 
Moreau§ 
The NASA Constellation Program is aiming to establish a long-term presence 
on the lunar surface.  The Constellation elements (Orion, Altair, Earth Departure 
Stage, and Ares launch vehicles) will require a lunar navigation architecture for 
navigation state updates during lunar-class missions.  Orion in particular has 
baselined earth-based ground direct tracking as the primary source for much of 
its absolute navigation needs.  However, due to the uncertainty in the lunar 
navigation architecture, the Orion program has had to make certain assumptions 
on the capabilities of such architectures in order to adequately scale the vehicle 
design trade space.  The following paper outlines lunar navigation requirements, 
the Orion program assumptions, and the impacts of these assumptions to the lu-
nar navigation architecture design.  The selection of potential sites was based 
upon geometric baselines, logistical feasibility, redundancy, and abort support 
capability.  Simulated navigation covariances mapped to entry interface flight-
path-angle uncertainties were used to evaluate knowledge errors.  A minimum 
ground station architecture was identified consisting of Goldstone, Madrid, 
Canberra, Santiago, Hartebeeshoek, Dongora, Hawaii, Guam, and Ascension Is-
land (or the geometric equivalent). 
INTRODUCTION 
In contrast to NASA’s Apollo missions, NASA’s Constellation Program is aiming to establish 
a long term presence on the lunar surface.  In that spirit, a lunar transportation system ferrying 
humans and cargo from Earth to a fixed lunar surface point and back is being designed consisting 
of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, the Altair lunar lander, the Earth Departure Stage (EDS), 
and both of the Ares launch vehicles.  Many of these Constellation elements will nominally de-
pend on the yet-to-be defined lunar navigation architecture as the primary source for navigation 
state updates.  Orion in particular has baselined this operations scenario for much of its absolute 
navigation needs.  However, due to the uncertainty in the lunar navigation architecture, the Orion 
program has had to make certain assumptions on the capabilities of such architectures in order to 
adequately scale the vehicle design trade space  The following paper outlines lunar navigation 
requirements, the Orion program assumptions, and the impacts of these assumptions to the lunar 
navigation architecture design..  In a general sense, this architicture includes Earth-based ground 
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direct tracking, lunar in-situ radiometrics, and onboard optical navigation capabilities.  Special 
attention in this study is paid to Earth-based ground direct tracking and the geometrical distribu-
tion of tracking sites to support nominal and contingency operations in a varity of flight phases. 
BACKGROUND 
Figure 1 illustrates the Constellation mission design for a Lunar Sortie (seven day surface 
stay) mission. 
Figure 1:  Illustration of a Sample Constellation Lunar Mission for a Seven-Day Lunar Surface Stay1 
 
Orion is launched separately from the EDS / Altair stack in low Earth orbit.  Orion then per-
forms rendezvous and docking operations to mate with the EDS / Altair stack.  The EDS per-
forms the initial Trans Lunar Injection (TLI) burn to place Orion and Altair on lunar trajectory.  
The EDS is jettisoned shortly thereafter.  During the coast flight to the Moon, four Trajectory 
Correction Maneuvers (TCMs 1 – 4) are performed to optimize the lunar arrival conditions.  In 
lunar orbit, the Altair vehicle performs three Lunar Orbit Insertion burns (LOI 1 – 3).  LOI-1 cap-
tures the mated vehicles into a high eccentricity lunar orbit.  LOI-2 changes the plane of the lunar 
orbit so the appropriate landing site is achievable.  LOI-3 circularizes the orbit about the Moon.  
Once in the circular orbit, Altair undocks from Orion and lands on the Moon at the desired land-
ing site.  After the lunar surface operations have been completed, the ascent stage of Altair lifts 
off from the lunar surface and performs a rendezvous with Orion.  Once the crew and supplies 
have transferred from the Altair ascent stage to the Orion vehicle, the Altair ascent stage is jetti-
soned and Orion reverses the three burn LOI sequence with a three burn Trans-Earth Injection 
(TEI) sequence.  TEI-3 places Orion on an Earth-return trajectory.  During the Earth-return coast, 
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three TCMs (TCMs 5 – 7) are performed to optimize Earth arrival conditions.  Prior to entry, 
Orion jettisons its Service Module component and then may perform one of two types of entries: 
1. A ballistic entry (utilized in the case of contingencies such as loss of communica-
tions). 
2. A skip entry where the Orion vehicle skips out of the atmosphere and re-enters.  The 
skip entry allows for Orion to better control its landing site. 
 
The absolute navigation design for each of these vehicles in LEO consists of Global Position-
ing System (GPS) measurement processing and Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) sensed veloci-
ties for position and velocity determination.  Star trackers perform attitude determination.  How-
ever, the focus of this paper is navigation for lunar transit, lunar orbit, and Earth return.  For these 
phases of flight, the baseline absolute navigation design uses propagated ground-generated ra-
diometric solutions uplinked to the vehicles.  Note that Orion does have an optical navigation ca-
pability for use in the case of loss of communications, however optical navigation is not the focus 
of this paper. 
REQUIREMENTS 
Figure 2 illustrates the Constellation program requirements flow. 
 
Figure 2:  Illustration of Constellation Program Requirements Flow 
 
The Constellation Architecture Requirements Document (CARD) establishes the high level 
requirements for the Constellation program.  This is where requirements such as global lunar ac-
cess, anytime return, and precision water landing reside.  The CARD also establishes the re-
quirement that the Mission Systems project will independently calculate the navigation state of 
Constellation vehicles.  Note that Mission Systems includes the mission operations team at 
NASA-JSC – and therefore the navigation flight controllers. 
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The next level of requirements, include the project Subsystem Requirements Documents 
(SRD), which are the NASA decomposition of the CARD requirements for the various projects. 
For the Orion project, requirements such as Orion shall navigate within six hours (to support any-
time return) and the total amount of translational delta-velocity required to support a mission are 
documented here.   
The final level of requirements documentation (continuing with Orion project as an example) 
includes the GNC Subsystem Specifications document.  At this level, the CARD and SRD re-
quirements are decomposed to verifiable requirements on the Orion navigation system.  The 
Orion Orbit GNC MODE team is responsible for technical decomposition of these requirements.  
Therefore, this document will contain required navigation state uncertainties prior to each transla-
tional maneuver.  Such a requirement ensures that the Orion maintains the delta-velocity budget 
for which the propellant tanks are sized.  Another driving requirement for the Orion navigation 
system concerns the allowable dispersions of entry-interface flight path angle.  To meet the re-
quirement on precision water landing, a skip entry profile is utilized and necessitates a tight entry 
flight path angle corridor (on the order of 0.12°)*. 
As mentioned previously, the navigation design for lunar transit, lunar orbit, and Earth transit 
consists of the uplink of ground calculated navigation solutions from radiometric measurements.  
Such measurements include 2-way range, 2-way Doppler, and 3-way Doppler from Earth-based 
ground direct tracking.  Additionally, proposals have been made to augment the lunar navigation 
architecture with Lunar Relay Satellites (LRS).  Figure 3 illustrates the concept of LRS, which 
would provide TDRS-like functionality to Constellation elements in lunar orbit and on the lunar 
surface (communications and tracking). 
 
Figure 3: Lunar Relay Satellites Augmenting the Navigation Architecture 
 
                                                     
*
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Clearly, LRS would provide an enhanced capability for lunar missions allowing Mission Sys-
tems to communicate with Constellation elements on the Moon’s far side.  In addition, the addi-
tion of LRS measurements will only serve to improve the navigation performance by providing 
additional tracking capability, including on the Moon’s far side where Earth based ground track-
ing does not have line of sight.  However, if one assumes that LRS would have little or no utility 
in lunar transit or Earth return flight, then the addition of LRS does not eliminate the need for a 
robust Earth-based ground direct tracking capability.  To illustrate this, consider the sensitivity of 
entry flight path angle to a delta-velocity (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Sensitivity of Entry Flight Path Angle to ∆V. 
 
Figure 4 shows that during Earth transit flight, small delta-velocities imparted on the Orion 
vehicle can have a significant impact on the entry interface conditions.  Such delta-velocities may 
be imparted on the vehicle from vehicle venting (CO2 for atmosphere conditioning and urine 
vents), reaction control jet firings for attitude maintenance, or reaction control jet firings for atti-
tude maneuvers.  These small perturbing accelerations on the vehicle are colloquially known in 
the navigation community as “flak”.  Clearly, the presence of flak not only may cause the vehicle 
to fly a trajectory outside of the entry flight path angle corridor, but the timing of the flak is also a 
concern.  For example, a flak event that occurs after a TCM maneuver targeting calculation may 
result in the burn calculation being invalid, or even worse, may result in a detrimental burn.  
Therefore, a capability for short arc solutions (generating a navigation state with only minutes of 
tracking data) is an important feature of the Earth-based ground direct tracking infrastructure.   
As the entry flight path angle is a driving requirement and the entry flight path angle is par-
ticularly sensitive to changes in velocity during Earth transit, the remaining focus of this paper is 
on Earth-based ground direct tracking and its capability to resolve the entry flight path angle. 
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DERIVATION OF THE ORION ORBIT MODE TEAM POSITION 
Assumptions and Constraints 
Previous analyses3 have demonstrated the sensitivity of navigation performance to the location 
of Earth-based ground tracking assets.  Particularly important to navigation performance is the 
maintenance of a North-South and East-West baseline.  To illustrate this, consider Figure 5 which 




Figure 5: 1σ Entry Flight Path Angle Uncertainty for an Earth Return Trajectory Utilizing 
a Sample of Apollo-Era Ground Network Trackers2 
 
Note that these results were generated assuming the ground station architecture that was avail-
able during Apollo (i.e., the locations of trackers were representative of the Apollo network).  The 
Orion MODE team has used an assumption, agreed-upon by Constellation Systems Integration, 
that any future navigation architecture would have the performance of the Apollo network in 
terms of geometric visibility and ability to generate short arc solutions. 
While the current three station DSN-only network does provide East-West and North-South 
geometry, it is insufficient for Orion lunar missions because of its inability to generate short-arc 
solutions3.  Additionally, such a network does not necessarily provide continuous tracking for all 
permutations of Orion mission design3.  Finally, the three station DSN network is susceptible to 
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rapidly degenerating navigation performance with the loss of a single site.  Therefore, with the 
realization that budget and schedule constraints likely preclude a replica of the Apollo network, 
Orion MODE team engineers set out to determine the minimum number of ground stations 
needed to support lunar missions.  The selection of potential sites was done based on the follow-
ing criteria: 
 
1. The maintenance of a North-South and East-West baseline. 
2. The logistical feasibility of a site (site must either have government or commercial assets 
currently in place or have sufficient infrastructure to support a ground station). 
3. Redundancy. 
4. Support of abort operations / anytime return. 
 
Practically, criterion 1, 3, and 4 means continuous tracking from at least four trackers for most 
of the mission.  Continuous tracking from three trackers (with at least one in the opposite hemi-
sphere – North or South) would satisfy criterion 1 and 4, but such architecture would not be sin-
gle fault tolerant to loss of the station located in the opposite hemisphere.  For example, if two 
trackers were located in the Northern hemisphere and one in the Southern hemisphere, failure of 
the Southern hemisphere tracker causes a loss of North-South baseline observability. 
To satisfy criterion 4, the Orbit MODE team considered sites from the Deep Space Network 
(DSN), the Department of Defense (DoD) – preferably sites with some tracking capability regard-
less of current ability to support lunar missions, and finally Universal Space Network’s (USN) 
PrioraNet. 
The Orion Orbit MODE team believes that a ground station architecture consisting of the sta-
tions listed in Table 1 (or with comparable geometry) is the minimum necessary in order to sup-
port lunar missions.  
Table 1 
ORION MODE TEAM GROUND STATIONS 
Station Notes 
Goldstone, California DSN Station 
Santiago, Chile USN Station 
Ascension Island Former Apollo station, C-band tracking facility 
Hartebeesthoeck, South Africa USN Station 
Madrid, Spain DSN Station 
Dongora, Australia USN Station 
Guam Former Apollo station, US military installation 
Canberra, Australia DSN station 
Hawaii USN Station 
 
The nine stations were selected based on coverage and navigation analyses that will be dis-
cussed below.  Note that the Orion analyses do not consider link budgets, tracking multiple vehi-
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cles, redundancy of trackers at a particular site, etc.  These studies assume that the trackers at the 
proposed sites are dedicated to the Orion vehicle and scheduling is also not an issue.  In other 
words, the studies are purely an exercise in the geometrical sensitivities to ground station archi-
tectures. 
The Spacecraft Tracking Data Network (STDN) simulation, which has been well documented, 
served as the primary analysis tool3.  The assumptions and filter constraints do not deviate from 
the references.  To evaluate navigation performance, single STDN runs were performed with a 
variety of navigation architecture assumptions.  The covariances from these runs were then 




EI P ΨΦΨΦ=γ  (1) 
where 
 Ψ = ∂γ∂x  (2) 
 
The primary trajectory for study is the CFP-1 trajectory4, based on a seven day lunar surface 
stay with a 3.5 day return trajectory to Earth.  If additional trajectories are utilized, they are noted 
appropriately.  Recall that for Earth-return trajectories, entry flight path corridor uncertainty is 
desired to be less than 0.12°, 3σ, at entry interface.  This figure includes knowledge and delivery 
errors, so the navigation accuracy will necessarily be some fraction of this corridor.  The particu-
lar budgeting of this error is ongoing work within the design team. 
Analysis Results 
The initial backbone of any ground station architecture will most certainly be the DSN.  For 
the purposes of these analyses, the DSN is assumed to consist of trackers located at Goldstone 
(California, USA), Madrid (Spain), and Canberra (Australia). 
As mentioned previously, the DSN-only network is insufficient to support lunar missions be-
cause of its inability to generate short arc solutions, its potential lack of continuous tracking, and 
the lack of site redundancy.  However, augmenting the DSN with USN trackers has been pro-
posed.  Therefore, consider a ground network consisting of the DSN augmented by Santiago, 
Hartebeesthoeck, and Dongora.  As shown in Figure 6, this ground network architecture provides 
a significant gap in the North-South baseline coverage prior to Trajectory Control Maneuver 7 
(TCM 7).   
                                                     
*
 Refer to the Notation section of this paper for a key of variables. 
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Figure 6: Ground Station Visibility at TCM-7. Note trajectory moves from East to West. 
 
An examination of Figure 7 demonstrates how the entry flight path angle uncertainty is in-
creased during the periods of tracking with just Dongora, Hartebeesthoek, and Canberra (all 
Southern hemisphere stations) which has a poor North – South geometry. 
 
Figure 7: 1σ Entry Flight Path Angle uncertainty for Earth-return trajectory for a 
ground station architecture consisting of DSN augmented with Santiago, Hartebeesthoek, 
and Dongora. 
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Initially, it was thought that a ground station at Guam would close the gap for the North-South 
baseline.  However, two issues arise with selection of Guam: 
1. Guam’s longitude is close to that of Canberra meaning that the East-West 
baseline may not be sufficient. 
2. As will be shown later, the navigation performance of this six station network 
augmented with Guam quickly deteriorates past the CFP-1 TCM’s . 
Because of this, Hawaii was found to be more effective with respect to the navigation perform-
ance and the Orion operational timeline.  To illustrate this, consider Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: 1σ Entry Flight Path Angle for Earth-return trajectory for a ground station 
architectures consisting of DSN augmented with Santiago, Hartebeesthoek, and Dongora.  
Architectures are then traded with Guam and Hawaii 
 
In Figure 8, the entry flight path angle uncertainty for the same Earth return trajectory utilized 
in Figure 7 is plotted.  However, two additional runs are included, one with Hawaii and one with 
Guam.  While utilizing Guam generally results in better navigation performance, near TCM-6 the 
uncertainty in the entry flight path angle starts to increase.  Operationally, if TCM-6 were to be 
delayed a few hours, the navigation uncertainty will increase.  Conversely, the utilization of Ha-
waii provides consistent navigation performance about TCM-6.  Therefore, it is more desirable to 
have Hawaii rather than Guam in the navigation architecture.   
Note that at this point, a seven station ground architecture has been derived that satisfies crite-
rion 1 and 2 for the nominal timeline for a specific Earth return trajectory only.  A closer look at 
Figure 8 shows that there are significant spikes in entry flight path angle uncertainty, due to poor 
tracking geometry, that could make it problematic for abort operations or anytime return.  This is 
particularly true if an abort operation necessitates a maneuver during one of these spikes.  There-
fore, it is desirable to have a navigation architecture capable of minimizing or eliminating these 
spikes throughout a mission.  Additionally, criterion 3 - redundancy - has yet to be addressed.  
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To begin, adding Guam to the seven station network would add an additional level of redun-
dancy for the periods of tracking where Hawaii would be the only Northern hemisphere tracking 
facility.  In other words, with the addition of Guam, the ability to have North-South observability 
would be single-fault-tolerant to loss of Hawaii.  This is particularly important since this tracking 
geometry (Pacific Ocean sites) currently manifests itself near the TCM maneuvers. 
While the addition of Guam helps, a closer examination of Figure 8 reveals periods where the 
flight path angle uncertainty grows at the same rate and magnitude for the networks studied to 
date.  Specifically, the flight path angle uncertainty spikes between day 1 to day 1.5 and day 2 
and 2.5.  To further illustrate this, consider Figure 9 which plots the entry flight path angle uncer-
tainty for an Earth return trajectory utilizing the DSN, Santiago, Hartebeesthoek, Dongora, Guam 
and Hawaii. 
 
Figure 9: 1σ Entry Flight Path Angle for an Earth-return trajectory utilizing DSN, 
Santiago, Hartebeesthoek, Dongora, Guam and Hawaii 
The growth in these uncertainties is due to tracking only available from Madrid and Harte-
beesthoek.  This combination of stations has weak observability into the East-West baseline and 
is obviously not redundant.  Therefore, to close this tracking gap, locating a tracker in the Atlantic 
Ocean would be optimal. 
Two tracking site locations were considered in order to close this “Atlantic Ocean” gap.  The 
first is located at Merritt Island, Florida where a soon to be decommissioned Apollo tracking fa-
cility still exits.  The other site is Ascension Island, where C-band tracking facilities currently 
exist.  Figure 10 compares the navigation performance from the eight station network augmented 
with either Merrit Island (MILA) or Ascension Island. 
These results indicate that Ascension Island rather than Merrit Island is more effective at clos-
ing the geometrical observability gap, which matches the Figure 5 result showing minimal com-
mon visibility between MILA and Madrid or Canberra.  Therefore, a nine station network consist-
ing of the DSN, Santiago, Ascension Island, Hartebeesthoek, Dongora, Guam, and Hawaii has 
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been shown to constantly provide the requisite geometrical observability for an Earth return tra-
jectory to support a nominal mission and any time return or abort.   
 
Figure 10: 1σ Entry Flight Path Angle uncertainty for an Earth return trajectory utiliz-
ing DSN, Santiago, Hartebeesthoek, Dongora, Guam, Hawaii and either MILA or Ascen-
sion Island 
Because this network is nicely scattered about the Earth, Figure 11 demonstrates it provides 
near continuous tracking from at least four trackers and continuous tracking from three trackers 
(except close to the Earth where such geometry is not feasible and not needed). 
 
Figure 11: Number of trackers available for nine station architecture on a lunar return 
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Therefore, as all Orion entry trajectories will converge to the same Earth fixed entry corridors, 
it is a reasonable expectation that such a 9 station network will provide the necessary coverage for 
almost any feasible trajectory.  To be sure, a run was conducted for a trajectory segment between 
TEI-2 and TEI-3 for the case when the Moon is located at the minimum Earth fixed latitude.  This 
particular trajectory was fairly troublesome as the DSN only network was unable to provide con-
tinuous tracking and communications because Canberra is on the far side of the Earth.  Figure 12 
demonstrates that not only is there continuous tracking with this 9 station network, but for the 
entire arc there are at least three stations tracking concurrently and for most of the arc at least four 
stations are tracking. 
 
Figure 12: Number of trackers available for low Earth fixed lat.  from TEI-2 to TEI-3 
CONCLUSION 
Based on completed Orion analyses, Orion Orbit MODE Team engineers have determined 
geometric sensitivities of navigation performance to ground station architectures.  Leveraging off 
of this knowledge, Orion Orbit MODE Team engineers selected candidate ground stations from 
existing NASA, DoD, or commercial assets.   
From these studies, the Orion Orbit MODE team feels that a minimum ground station archi-
tecture should include the geometric equivalent of DSN, Santiago, Hartebeesthoek, Dongora, and 
Hawaii.  However, such a network would not necessarily be able to support abort operations / 
any-time return and is not site redundant.  To address these issues, the Orion Orbit MODE team 
feels that a ground station architecture should also include assets at Guam and Ascension Island.   
Finally, it should be noted that the work here presented is not a promotion of any particular 
lunar navigation architecture.  The Orbit Orion MODE is open to nearly any and all manifesta-
tions of a lunar navigation architecture as long as it has the performance characteristics (accuracy 
and short arc capability described above).  It is left as open work to develop metrics that will al-
low for the characterization of the performance of various architectures that is independent of 
mission phase.  It is also important to ensure that such metrics correspond to navigation perform-
ance, short arc capability, and applicability to various architectures.  Since geometry has been 
identified as a driving consideration, an evaluation of various dilution of precision algorithms is 
currently under way. 
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NOTATION 
γ Flight path angle 
Φ State transition matrix 
Ψ  Matrix of Partial Derivatives (flight path angle with respect to the state) 
CARD Constellation Architecture Requirements Document 
DoD Department of Defense 
DSN Deep Space Network 
EI Entry interface [defined in NASA programs at an altitude of 121.92km (400,000 ft) ] 
GPS Global Positioning System 
LOI Lunar Orbit Insertion 
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit 
P The navigation covariance matrix 
SRD Subsystem Requirements Document 
STDN Spacecraft Tracking and Data Network 
TEI Trans-Earth Injection 
TCM Trajectory Correction Maneuver 
TLI Trans-Lunar Injection 
USN Universal Space Network 
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